Mechanisms ‘all the way down’?

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Opublikowane: gru 31, 2023
DOI: https://doi.org/10.59203/zfn.74.691

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Ioan Muntean
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Abstrakt

Book review: Mechanistic Explanations in Physics and Beyond, Brigitte Falkenburg and Gregor Schiemann, editors, European Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 11, Springer International Publishing, Cham 2019, pp.220

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Jak cytować
Muntean, I. (2023). Mechanisms ‘all the way down’?. Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce, (74), 302–316. https://doi.org/10.59203/zfn.74.691
Numer
Nr 74 (2023): The Nature and Norms of Scientific Explanation
Dział
Recenzje
Creative Commons License

Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Użycie niekomercyjne – Bez utworów zależnych 4.0 Międzynarodowe.

Bibliografia

Falkenburg, B. and Schiemann, G., eds., 2019. Mechanistic Explanations in Physics and Beyond [Online]. Vol. 11, European Studies in Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-10707-9.

Glennan, S., 2002. Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science [Online], 69(S3), pp.342–353. https://doi.org/10.1086/341857.

Glennan, S., 2017. The New Mechanical Philosophy. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Humphreys, P., 2019. Knowledge transfer across scientific disciplines. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A [Online], 77, pp.112–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.11.001.

Illari, P., 2013. Mechanistic explanation: Integrating the ontic and epistemic. Erkenntnis [Online], 78(S2), pp.237–255. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9511-y.

Illari, P. and Glennan, S., eds., 2017. The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. London.

Illari, P.M. and Williamson, J., 2011. What is a mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms across the sciences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science [Online], 2(1), pp.119–135. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-011-0038-2.

Kuhlmann, M., 2017. Mechanisms in physics. In: P. Illari, S. Glennan, P. Illari and S. Glennan, eds. The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. London, pp.283–296.

Kuhlmann, M. and Glennan, S., 2014. On the relation between quantum mechanical and neo-mechanistic ontologies and explanatory strategies. European Journal for Philosophy of Science [Online], 4(3), pp.337–359.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-014-0088-3.

Machamer, P., Darden, L. and Craver, C.F., 2000. Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science [Online], 67(1), pp.1–25. https://doi.org/10.1086/392759.

Oppenheim, P. and Putnam, H., 1958. Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis. In: H. Feigl et al., eds. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. 1. Minnesota.

Piccinini, G., 2015. Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Salmon, W.C., 1984. Scientific explanation: Three basic conceptions. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association [Online], (2), pp.293–305. https://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1984.2.192510.

Salmon, W.C., 1989. Four decades of scientific explanation. In: P. Kitcher and W.C. Salmon, eds. Scientific Explanation [Online], Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, 13. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp.3–219. Available at: <http://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/185700> [visited on 4 October 2023].

Woodward, J., 2013. Mechanistic explanation: Its scope and limits. Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume, Supp(87), pp.39–65.

Wright, C., 2012. Mechanistic explanation without the ontic conception. European Journal for Philosophy of Science [Online], 2(3), pp.375–394. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-012-0048-8.