The cognitive status of a theory: F. Bonsack's epistemological realism

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Jerzy Kaczmarek

Abstract

This paper puts forward mainly F. Bonsack's and Gonseth's conception of epistemological realism. In their opinion theory is characterized by schematic correspondence with the reality. It regards current controversy between realists and antirealists and conditions of cognitive world view. The cognitive objectivism may increase through exploring and elimination subjective determinants. It considers the criterion of physical reality of the object of cognition, which was set up by F. Bonsack. This criterion is associated with invariable cognitive contents. In this article this criterion and its hypothetic character are shown.

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The cognitive status of a theory: F. Bonsack’s epistemological realism. (2007). Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne W Nauce), 40, 30-58. https://www.zfn.edu.pl/index.php/zfn/article/view/282