Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)
type: channel
description: Philosophical Problems in Science (Polish: Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce, abbrev. ZFN) is the oldest Polish journal dedicated to the philosophy in science. ZFN covers a wide range of topics of general interest to those working on philosophical problems involved in and intertwined with modern science (see Focus and Scope). ZFN has originated from a long tradition of Krakow philosophy of nature dating back to the second half of the nineteenth century (see Journal History). The journal policy is to continue the tradition of mutual discussion between philosophers and scientists.
publisher: Copernicus Center Foundation
language: en
publication name: Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)
issn: 0867-8286
items: From simple rules to quasi intentionality: emergent coordination and collective cognition
items: Towards happiness: Ancient Greek values in theage of computational intelligence supportinghappiness — selected issues
items: The problem of scene understanding by artificial autonomous agents
items: More than a tool: Artificial Intelligence in a philosophical history of technologies
items: From Digital Twins to Entangled Twins
items: Consciousness, normativity, and intrinsicmeaning in large language models
items: Is the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” a miracle that points to God? Wigner and Craig on the applicability of mathematics
items: “Philosophy in science” and “science as philosophy”. Some selected philosophical views of Małgorzata Głódź
items: Tractability assumptions and derivational robustness, a match made in heaven?
items: The synthetic a priori. Rejoinder to Linsbichler
items: Upholding human dignity in AI: Advocating moral reasoning over consensus ethics for value alignment
items: Ray Kurzweil's manifesto of technological utopia
items: Homeostasis as a foundation for adaptive and emotional artificial intelligence
items: From a nitty-gritty debate within economics into the deep waters of philosophy of science. Introduction to the special issue of ZFN
items: At the interface of theory and experience
items: Explaining the undecidability of first-order logic
items: Orientation in the environment like perceiving affordances? Andrzej Lewicki’s account of cognition
items: Mechanisms ‘all the way down’?
items: The nature and norms of scientific explanation: Some preliminaries
items: Philosophy in the context of physics and cosmology: Leszek M. Sokołowski’s philosophical views
items: Are there really any errors in the Austrian theory of welfare?
items: From philosophy in science to information in nature: Michael Heller’s ideas
items: How science tracks understanding
items: The role of phronesis in Knowledge-Based Economy
items: The interdisciplinary profile of theology—fashion or necessity?
items: Ludwig Lachmann: A subjectivist institutionalist, but not a nihilist
items: Philosophy in technology: A research program
items: On the philosophy and logic of human action: A Neo-Austrian contribution to the methodology of the social sciences
items: What Rothbard could have done but did not do: The merits of Austrian economics without extreme apriorism
items: A praxeology of the value of life. A critique of Rothbard’s argument

From simple rules to quasi intentionality: emergent coordination and collective cognition
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description: This article examines whether quasi-intentional organisation characterised by anticipation, adaptation and retention can arise in distributed systems composed of simple agents without global goal representation. The analysis draws on observations of Camponotus barbaricus ants that construct and stabilise pine-needle barriers in the absence of central control. An agent-based model implemented in NetLogo formalises selected construction dynamics through local rules governing exploration, material deposition and reinforcement of stable configurations. Three operational indicators are introduced to examine system-level organisation: pre-disturbance increases in construction activity, directional changes in structural stability across iterations and reconstruction of previously stabilised patterns after partial removal. The model functions as a constrained artificial-life environment for analysing purposive-looking organisation emerging from distributed interaction and environmental traces. The concept of quasi intentionality is situated within biosemiotic accounts of environmental semiosis and a relational ontology of agency, and is discussed in relation to current approaches to symbiotic and beneficial artificial systems.
subject: SPECIAL ISSUE: Philosophy in Technology
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creator: Anna Sarosiek
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-31
publication date: 2025-12-31
doi: 10.59203/zfn.79.727

Towards happiness: Ancient Greek values in theage of computational intelligence supportinghappiness — selected issues
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description: This article offers a selective, concise comparison of the ancient Greeks’ ideas about happiness with contemporary metrics and AI-mediated wellbeing apps. It argues that these schools’ views of happiness provide criteria for assessing the trajectory of today’s approaches of development to the subject of happiness. Using a critical–analytical approach, it presents and compares those schools with major happiness metrics (e.g.,World Happiness Report, Better Life Index, Happy Planet Index, Gallup Global Emotions) and popular wellbeing applications (Headspace, Calm, Insight Timer, Happify). The findings clarify where ancient insights align or clash with current practices and offer implications for wellbeing technologies. The paper also evaluates whether AI can support eudaimonia without eroding autonomy or commodifying the inner life. The article raises awareness that we are entering a new phase of understanding happiness, in which technology influences our choices and becomes not only a tool, but also a co-creator of our everyday experiences.
subject: SPECIAL ISSUE: Philosophy in Technology
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creator: Teresa Marcinów
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-31
publication date: 2025-12-31
doi: 10.59203/zfn.79.749

The problem of scene understanding by artificial autonomous agents
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description: In this paper, the problem of scene understanding in the context of autonomous robotics is considered. The implemented solutions, based on various types of artificial intelligence systems, are described and the perspectives of their development are discussed. In particular, the problem of cognition that reflects the structure and nature of the environment in which the artificial autonomous agent operates, is studied. The specifics of scene models and algorithms for their construction and verification of their adequacy are discussed. The presentation of the existing partial solutions, including the results obtained by the authors, is the starting point of the analysis. Possibilities of new approaches are analysed, especially those that are biologically inspired. The potential fundamental limitations are studied. These problems are discussed in the context of epistemology and in the frame of cybernetics. The analysis of the relationship between philosophy and artificial intelligence in the aspect of cognitive vision systems of autonomous robots is the aim of this paper.
subject: SPECIAL ISSUE: Philosophy in Technology
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creator: Andrzej Bielecki
creator: Marzena Bielecka
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-31
publication date: 2025-12-31
doi: 10.59203/zfn.79.732

More than a tool: Artificial Intelligence in a philosophical history of technologies
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description: This article examines artificial intelligence and shows how it is embedded in a history of technology. It develops a philosophical classification of tools as technologies based on the degree and nature of mediation that technology provides between humans and the world. Drawing on phenomenological and post-phenomenological conceptions—in particular the work of Ihde, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty—it identifies five distinct stages in the historical development of technology, ranging from simple passive extensions of the body to advanced artificial intelligence systems. Each stage is defined by a qualitatively different mode of technological mediation between humans and the world, each transforming human perception and intentionality in increasingly complex ways. The most recent contemporary fifth stage in the evolution of technology, is characterized by the use of artificial neural networks, and the article demonstrates that a significant break from lower artificial intelligence systems separates this technology. Unlike simpler machines, these systems exhibit partial autonomy, are not epistemically transparent, and their outputs are unpredictable, forcing us to rethink their instrumental nature and the nature of instrumentality itself.
subject: SPECIAL ISSUE: Philosophy in Technology
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creator: Miroslav Vacura
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-31
publication date: 2025-12-31
doi: 10.59203/zfn.79.730

From Digital Twins to Entangled Twins
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description: This article introduces the concept of Entangled Twins (ETs) as an interdisciplinary framework emerging from a sustained dialogue between Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) research and phenomenological philosophy. Building on the Digital Twin (DT) paradigm while critically reworking its representational logic, ETs are conceived as relational configurations in which human users and AI-driven systems become dynamically entangled, with significant implications for agency, responsibility, and human-centered design. The theoretical framework draws on phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity and embodiment (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre) together with design-oriented concerns in HCI. Within this perspective, human–machine interaction is conceptualized in terms of a We-subject: a plural and co-constituted configuration of agency. Through this interdisciplinary approach, a prototypical audio-augmented experience is examined as a phenomenologically informed case, elucidating the conditions under which human–machine entanglement can emerge. On this basis, the paper argues that ETs raise distinctive questions concerning responsibility and agency, articulating an ethics of entanglement capable of informing the human-centered aspirations of Industry 5.0.
subject: SPECIAL ISSUE: Philosophy in Technology
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creator: Floriana Ferro
creator: Alessandro Giuseppe Privitera
creator: Andrea Gulli
creator: Michele Geronazzo
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-31
publication date: 2025-12-31
doi: 10.59203/zfn.79.729

Consciousness, normativity, and intrinsicmeaning in large language models
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description: Recent advances in large language models (LLMs), together with renewed speculation about artificial consciousness, have intensified debates concerning meaning and semantic intentionality in artificial systems. This paper advances a restricted and conditional thesis: even if LLMs were to possess some form of consciousness, this would not suffice to establish intrinsic semantic intentionality. To clarify this claim, I introduce a hieroglyph-copying thought experiment showing that consciousness, even when accompanied by goal-directed or procedural intentionality, does not guarantee normatively assessable semantic content. Drawing on this result, I argue that contemporary LLM architectures—despite their ability to generate contextually appropriate linguistic outputs—operate through probabilistic optimization processes that do not by themselves ground epistemic commitment or truth-directed representation. The argument does not deny the sophistication of LLM representations nor attempt to resolve competing theories of meaning. Rather, it isolates and defends an insufficiency thesis: consciousness alone does not ground intrinsic semantics. The apparent meaningfulness of LLM outputs is therefore best understood as dependent on human interpretive projection rather than as an internally grounded semantic achievement.
subject: SPECIAL ISSUE: Philosophy in Technology
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creator: Roman Krzanowski
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-31
publication date: 2025-12-31
doi: 10.59203/zfn.79.724

Is the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” a miracle that points to God? Wigner and Craig on the applicability of mathematics
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description: Eugene Wigner’s 1960 article on the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” used the word “miracle” of the fit between abstract mathematics and physical reality. William Lane Craig has developed a theistic argument from Wigner’s hints, claiming that the best explanation of the “miraculous” fit is divine creation. It is argued that this argument does not succeed. An Aristotelian realist philosophy of mathematics renders the applicability of mathematics to physical reality unmysterious by showing that mathematics, like any other science, is a study of certain aspects of reality, hence there is no miracle of fit. However, that does not preclude other arguments for the existence of God involving mathematics, for example design arguments from the elegance of the universe’s structure, fine-tuning arguments or ones from the nature of mathematical understanding.
subject: Articles
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creator: James Franklin
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-01
publication date: 2025-12-01
starting page: 13
ending page: 25
doi: 10.59203/zfn.78.721

“Philosophy in science” and “science as philosophy”. Some selected philosophical views of Małgorzata Głódź
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description: This article attempts to reconstruct and analyze some selected philosophical views of the Polish physicist Małgorzata Głódź, especially within the context of her links with the interdisciplinary milieu in Kraków (known as the “Kraków School of Philosophy in Science”). It emphasizes the significant role that Głódź played in the historical development of this intellectual tradition. The main portion of this article highlights the connections between Głódź’s philosophy and the philosophical ideas propagated by Michał Heller, the School’s main founder, and his students and other collaborators. The article also indicates elements of her philosophical achievements that deserve attention from the perspective of today’s philosophical challenges.
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creator: Kamil Trombik
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-01
publication date: 2025-12-01
starting page: 41
ending page: 55
doi: 10.59203/zfn.78.720

Tractability assumptions and derivational robustness, a match made in heaven?
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description: The epistemology of modeling in science is a topic that has received no shortage of attention from both philosophers and scientists. Models, with their ubiquitous unrealistic and false assumptions, raise a myriad of interesting epistemic questions. Many have picked up a concern expressed by biologist Richard Levins, which is that, for many models, it is unclear if any particular result is a product of the realistic assumptions, or if the result, is in some critical way, dependent on an unrealistic assumption. His suggestion of a solution to this problem, the use of robustness analysis, has similarly been picked up by many as a plausible solution to this concern. Since Levins’ time, taxonomies of modeling assumptions and types of robustness analyses have been developed. One common connection made is that of tractability assumption, or assumptions introduced for the purpose of mathematical tractability, and derivational robustness analysis, or a robustness analysis that tests the influence of assumptions on the derivation of some result. Derivational robustness analysis is often singled out as being particularly well-suited for resolving the epistemic concerns introduced by tractability assumptions. In this paper, I argue that, despite how it is commonly approached in the literature, tractability assumptions do not present a consistent set of epistemic concerns. Given this, derivational robustness analysis cannot be used to resolve the epistemic concerns raised by all tractability assumptions. In use this to motivate some concerns about how well-suited the taxonomy that includes tractability assumptions is to discussions about the epistemic concerns of unrealistic modeling assumptions.
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creator: Gareth Fuller
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-01
publication date: 2025-12-01
starting page: 27
ending page: 40
doi: 10.59203/zfn.78.709

The synthetic a priori. Rejoinder to Linsbichler
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description: Linsbichler is a gifted economist and philosopher. He delves mightily and thoroughly into the difficult thickets of basic praxeology, the methodology of the Austrian school of economics. Not content with merely probing the meaning and importance of the synthetic a priori, he pushes further into the very justification of this foundational element of Austrianism. I learned a lot from reading this splendid essay, most of with which I enthusiastically agree. However, there are a few divergences between the two of us, and the present paper is devoted to exploring them. My procedure in this response is one of mentioning numerous quotations from the author, interspersed with my own comments and reactions. That is because I greatly appreciate this gifted economist’s contribution to Austrian methodology. What are the specifics? One error is that he does accurately distinguish between analytic, empirical, and synthetic a priori. Another is his misunderstanding of “human action”. My debating partner opines that Mises (1998) merely suggests that human being act. In actual point of fact in the of this latter author, that is the very title of his most famous book, and contains the very core of praxeological economics. Then Linsbichler fails to accurately distinguish between mere behavior and human action. Further there is a dispute over the source of ideas. My learned colleague maintains it is empirical. I demur. He is of the opinion that empirical criticisms can be relevant to praxeological findings. I attempt to correct him on this matter. He takes the position can something can be “mildly aprioristic”. I demonstrate that this concept is an all or none phenomenon; no gradations.
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creator: Walter Block
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-01
publication date: 2025-12-01
starting page: 3
ending page: 11
doi: 10.59203/zfn.78.717

Upholding human dignity in AI: Advocating moral reasoning over consensus ethics for value alignment
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description: Artificial intelligence (AI) offers transformative advancements across sectors such as healthcare, agriculture, and environmental sustainability. However, a pressing ethical challenge remains: aligning AI systems with human values in a manner that is stable, coherent, and universally applicable. As AI increasingly mediates human perception, shapes social interactions, and influences decision-making, it raises profound ethical concerns about its impact on human dignity and social well-being. The prevailing consensus-based approach, advocated by figures such as Google DeepMind’s Iason Gabriel, suggests that AI ethics should reflect majority societal or political viewpoints. While this model offers flexibility, it also risks moral relativism and ethical instability as social norms fluctuate. This paper argues that consensus-based ethics are inadequate for safeguarding fundamental values—especially human dignity—which should not be subject to shifting public opinion. Instead, it advocates for a moral framework that transcends cultural and political trends, providing a stable foundation for AI ethics. Through case studies like social media recommendation algorithms that exploit users’ vulnerabilities, particularly those of children and teenagers, the paper highlights the risks of AI systems driven by profit-oriented metrics without ethical oversight. Drawing on insights from moral philosophy and theology, particularly the works of Joseph Ratzinger, it contends that aligning AI with moral reasoning is essential to uphold human dignity, prevent texploitation, and promote the common good.
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creator: Octavian-Mihai Machidon
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 25
ending page: 39
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.707

Ray Kurzweil's manifesto of technological utopia
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description: "The Singularity Is Nearer" by Ray Kurzweil is a bold manifesto of technological optimism, envisioning a future where humanity transcends its limits. While thought-provoking, the book is criticized for being overly idealistic, neglecting the ethical, social, and existential dilemmas of such profound changes. It emphasizes possibilities without fully addressing the challenges, highlighting that technology alone cannot solve humanity's most pressing issues.
subject: Review essays
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creator: Anna Sarosiek
rights: Copyright (c) 2025 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2025-12-01
publication date: 2025-12-01
starting page: 59
ending page: 64
doi: 10.59203/zfn.78.710

Homeostasis as a foundation for adaptive and emotional artificial intelligence
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description: Homeostasis, a fundamental biological mechanism, enables living organisms to maintain internal balance despite changing environmental conditions. Inspired by these adaptive processes, research into artificial intelligence (AI) seeks to develop systems capable of dynamic adaptation, introspection, and empathetic interactions with users. This article explores the potential of implementing homeostatic mechanisms in AI as a foundation for emotional intelligence and self-regulation. Key questions include the distinction between simulation and actual experience, the role of machine introspection, and the emergence of qualitative states akin to phenomenal experiences. Drawing on Antonio Damasio’s theory and classical concepts from cybernetics, the article investigates how homeostatic principles might inspire the development of AI, paving the way for more flexible and context-aware technologies.
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creator: Anna Sarosiek
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 41
ending page: 54
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.706

From a nitty-gritty debate within economics into the deep waters of philosophy of science. Introduction to the special issue of ZFN
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description: It all started in 2021 when we sparked a rather specific debate within Austrian economics in Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) – traditionally abbreviated as ZFN. The story unfolded as follows. First, Wysocki submitted a paper on the concept of indifference, as it is normally understood in the Austrian school of economics. To his astonishment and great relief, this then rising journal (now the one with well-established reputation, its Scopus ranking being as high as Q2 under the rubric of philosophy) accepted the submission in question and published it promptly in ZFN 71 as (Wysocki, 2021). It was an honour and a privilege, especially given the fact that Austrian economics – with all due respect to its scientific achievements – is nowadays not a mainstream economic current, to say the least. Hence, being published in ZFN only added to the strength of Wysocki’s belief that the journal is clearly unbiased towards any sort of philosophy of science. The very fact that Wysocki published a paper on indifference in Austrian economics and the fact that he spread the news about ZFN being also open to publishing maverick (after all, as already observed, Austrian economics is not a branch of mainstream economics) papers related to philosophy of science prompted Walter Block (a prominent Austrian economist) to submit to ZFN his rejoinder to Wysocki’s original paper on indifference, with the said response being ultimately published in ZFN 72 as (Block, 2022).
subject: Editorial
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creator: Walter Block
creator: Igor Wysocki
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 7
ending page: 15
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.704

At the interface of theory and experience
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description: The founding motto of philosophy in science is “tracking down big philosophical problems in contemporary science.” Knowing the basic history of philosophy and the history of science, we more or less know what “big philosophical topics” mean. The most representative topics of this kind include: time, space, causality, matter, life, consciousness, thinking... The tables of contents of philosophy textbooks could be copied to continue this list. These topics are big not only when they remain at a high level of generality, but also when they get down to special cases and particular sub-problems. Sometimes it is only then that they fully reveal their big format.
subject: Editorial
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creator: Michał Heller
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 9
ending page: 12
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.698

Explaining the undecidability of first-order logic
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description: Turing proved the unsolvability of the decision problem for first-order logic (Entscheidungsproblem) in his famous paper On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. From this proof it follows that attempts to specify a solution for the Entscheidungsproblem through pattern detection in automated theorem proving (ATP) must fail. Turing’s proof, however, merely predicts the non-existence of such solutions; it does not construct concrete examples that explain why specific attempts to solve the decision problem by pattern detection fail. ATP-search often runs in infinite loops in the case of unprovable, i.e. not refutable, formulas and one can ask why finite patterns of repeated inference steps cannot serve as criteria for unprovability. We answer this question by constructing pairs of formulas (ϕ,ϕ′) such that ϕ is provable (refutable) and ϕ′ is unprovable (satisfiable in an infinite domain) but all but the last proof step of the ATP-search for ϕ is a proper part of the endless ATP-search for ϕ′. We generate such pairs of formulas by mimicking computable sequences for a certain kind of universal Turing machine, namely, splitting Turing machines (STMs), via sequences of inference steps in ATP. In contrast to Turing’s and the textbooks’ method to formalize Turing machines, our method does not rely on further axioms and allows us to transfer the straightforward insight that the halting problem cannot be solved through pattern detection to the case of the Entscheidungsproblem. Our method is a constructive alternative to general undecidability proofs that explains why a scientific problem, namely the Entscheidungsproblem, is unsolvable in a specific way. This explanation provides a better understanding of the failure of pattern detection, which is of interest to: (i) the programmer, who is concerned with prospects and limits of pattern detection, (ii) the logician, who is interested in identifying logical properties by properties of an ideal notat…
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creator: Timm Lampert
creator: Anderson Nakano
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 3
ending page: 23
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.694

Orientation in the environment like perceiving affordances? Andrzej Lewicki’s account of cognition
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description: The purpose of this article is to present Andrzej Lewicki’s account of cognition as orientation in the environment, comparing it with James J. Gibson’s ecological psychology. To do so, we conduct a comparative analysis of the former’s theory of indicators and the latter’s theory of affordance. The theoretical frame for our study is cognitive ecology, a research tradition characteristic of various studies of cognition, including contemporary ones. This allows us to show that, despite differences in the backgrounds and methodologies of these researchers, Lewicki can be considered one of the pioneers of contemporary ecological trends in cognitive science, although his influence has not been as widespread as that of Gibson. Our analysis proceeds in several steps. We begin with an overview of the biographies, backgrounds, and interests of the two researchers, as well as a brief introduction to cognitive ecology and related terms. Next, we discuss action/value indicators theory and affordances theory. We then compare Lewicki’s and Gibson’s approaches in more detail in terms of their use of similar research heuristics. The article ends with conclusions that go beyond historical issues.
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creator: Michał Piekarski
creator: Witold Wachowski
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 71
ending page: 89
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.693

Mechanisms ‘all the way down’?
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description: Book review: Mechanistic Explanations in Physics and Beyond, Brigitte Falkenburg and Gregor Schiemann, editors, European Studies in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 11, Springer International Publishing, Cham 2019, pp.220
subject: Book reviews
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creator: Ioan Muntean
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 302
ending page: 316
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.691

The nature and norms of scientific explanation: Some preliminaries
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description: There are at least two deep and related debates about explanation: about its nature and about its norms. The aim of this special issue of Philosophical Problems in Science/Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce (ZFN) is to survey whether or not a consensus is at hand in these debates and to help settle what it can. The overarching foci are twofold: (i) the nature of scientific explanation, with special attention to the debate between ontic and epistemic conception of explanation, and (ii) the norms of scientific explanation, with special attention to so-called ‘ontic’ (or better, ‘alethic’) norms like truth and referential success and epistemic norms like intelligibility and idealized understanding. It called for advocates of various conceptions to articulate the current state of these debates. Researchers and scholars from around the globe—including Poland, Canada, Korea, The Netherlands, the United States, Greece, Austria, and Belgium—contributed. The special issue also attempts to provide an opening for new work on the norms of explanation, such as truth or model-based accuracy, information compression, abstraction, and generalization.
subject: Editorial
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creator: Abel Peña
creator: Cory Wright
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 5
ending page: 17
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.690

Philosophy in the context of physics and cosmology: Leszek M. Sokołowski’s philosophical views
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description: The article attempts to reconstruct and analyze selected philosophical views of Leszek Sokołowski—a Krakow physicist and cosmologist who published many works dealing with issues on the border of science and philosophy (including metaphysics). An important aim of the article is also to place Sokołowski’s views in the context of the concept of “philosophy in science” (by M. Heller) and the phenomenon of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science. In this paper, I suggest that Sokołowski’s views fit into the philosophy initiated by Michał Heller, and Sokołowski himself can be considered a member of the Kraków School of Philosophy in Science.
subject: Articles
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creator: Kamil Piotr Trombik
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-31
publication date: 2024-12-31
starting page: 55
ending page: 70
doi: 10.59203/zfn.77.689

Are there really any errors in the Austrian theory of welfare?
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description: This text reviews David Megger’s 2021 book entitled Justice in Welfare Economics. Libertarianism and the Austrian School (in Polish: Sprawiedliwość w ekonomii dobrobytu, liberatarianizm i szkoła austriacka). The review takes a critical approach, highlighting the most significant aspects of the presented considerations and emphasising their uniqueness and complexity. I intend to extensively discuss the author’s theses concerning the modification of the fundamental claims of Austrian school representatives about justice and welfare, highlighting both their strengths and weaknesses.
subject: Review essays
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creator: Mateusz Czyżniewski
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 505
ending page: 527
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.687

From philosophy in science to information in nature: Michael Heller’s ideas
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description: This paper discusses the concept of information formulated by Michael (Michał) Heller. Heller—a philosopher, theoretical physicist, cosmologist, and theologian—provided a complex image of information and its role in nature, which is rarely found in studies of information. Heller posited that the laws of nature may be interpreted as information, or as providing information, presenting this as a complementary view to scientific structuralism (not discussed in this paper). According to Heller, the informational content of a structure in nature is inversely proportional to that structure’s degree of freedom. The more constrained or complex a structure is, and the less likely it is to exist, the more information it contains. In Heller’s view, the concept of information in Shannon’s Theory of Communication (ToC) is inadequate for expressing the notion of information beyond a numerical measure of a signal structure. Information in Heller’s research closely aligns with the concepts of Jacquette’s and Perzanowski’s combinatorial ontology (concepts not discussed in this paper) and the general theory of information (GTI) of Mark Burgin, although Heller did not explicitly make these connections.
subject: Articles
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creator: Roman Krzanowski
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 83
ending page: 105
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.680

How science tracks understanding
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description: This review article discusses the book Understanding How Science Explains the World by Kevin McCain, published by Cambridge University Press (2022). With an impressive combination of clarity and depth, McCain provides the reader with a firm grasp of how science works, of what science aims to achieve, and of what makes science a successful epistemic enterprise. The review article reconstructs the book’s overall dialectic and identifies one potential point of tension which concerns the role of truth or accuracy in scientific knowledge.
subject: Book reviews
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creator: Federica Isabella Malfatti
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 317
ending page: 320
doi: 10.59203/zfn.74.685

The role of phronesis in Knowledge-Based Economy
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description: The aim of this paper is to reflect on contemporary understanding of “knowledge” within the Knowledge-Based Economy. Since the pursuit of knowledge has been a longstanding focus of European culture since Greek philosophy, we employ the original ancient terminology. Applying the hermeneutics of ancient texts along with critical and comparative analysis can aid in differentiating between “knowledge” and “wisdom”, often linked in modern theories, while also connecting this issue to the Aristotelian concept of phronesis. The authors argue that since human relations impact social (and so—economic) spheres, the issue of phronesis, a relational type of knowledge, should not go unexamined. The idea that application of knowledge (rather than its mere acquisition), crucial for the Knowledge-Based Economy, was embedded in the Greek term oikonomiké, which provides a basis for considering oneself a phronimos. Our aim is to demonstrate the value of phronesis particularly in the fields of management and the philosophical foundations of economics, as the skills encompassed within it have the potential to aid in educating not only a “sage” but also an active member of the community, capable of acting in a manner that benefits both themselves and the society.
subject: Articles
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creator: Anna Ceglarska
creator: Katarzyna Cymbranowicz
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 257
ending page: 296
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.667

The interdisciplinary profile of theology—fashion or necessity?
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description: This review pertains to the book Evolutionary Theology (Teologia ewolucyjna) written by Wojciech P. Grygiel and Damian Wąsek. The book presents a distinct and modern viewpoint on theology by offering a comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of theological language and utilizing it to reevaluate certain theological beliefs, such as the concept of original sin, within the framework of the ever-changing understanding of the Universe. This approach contributes significantly to the restoration of theology’s credibility in modern culture by bridging the gap between science and theology.
subject: Review essays
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creator: Andrzej Anderwald
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 259
ending page: 267
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.684

Ludwig Lachmann: A subjectivist institutionalist, but not a nihilist
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description: The legacy of Ludwig Lachmann within the Austrian School of Economics is subject to several interpretations in the literature: though he clearly considered himself a member of the school and he influenced many Austrian economists, his particular methodological claims prompted Murray Rothbard to disavow him as a nihilist. In this article, we defend Lachmann by arguing that in order to defend his methodological stance he invoked extra-Austrian influences (Max Weber, G.L.S. Shackle). This way, he championed subjectivist institutionalism consistently both in theory and in practice. His approach leaves a peculiar, unorthodox, yet positive legacy for contemporary Austrian economics, not so far from the orthodox Misesian stance as it is broadly understood.
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creator: Krzysztof Turowski
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 205
ending page: 256
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.674

Philosophy in technology: A research program
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description: Philosophy in technology is a research program that studies the philosophical roots of engineering and technology. Technologists, by virtue of their education, believe that the limits, goals, possibilities, and effects of technology on society and humankind are exclusively technological problems, hence their solutions must lie exclusively in technology. In contrast, philosophy in technology asserts that the resolutions to these problems need to be rooted in an understanding of their philosophical origins. This program paper defines the objectives of philosophy in technology, the kinds of questions it explores, the methods it uses, and how it differs from the philosophy of technology.
subject: Articles
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creator: Paweł Polak
rights: Copyright (c) 2023 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2023-12-31
publication date: 2023-12-31
starting page: 59
ending page: 81
doi: 10.59203/zfn.75.682

On the philosophy and logic of human action: A Neo-Austrian contribution to the methodology of the social sciences
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description: Philosophical action theory seems to be in pretty good shape. The same may not be true for the study of human action in economics. Famous is the rant that the study of human action in economics gives reason to tremble for the reputation of the subject. But how does this come about? Since economic action is about action, the broader study must surely have a strong impact on the more specific field. The paper sets out, from the ground up, how an essential concept in economic theory–the concept of competition–can fundamentally benefit from insights derived exclusively from analytical action theory broadly conceived. In doing so, the paper delivers on an old Austrian promise: it is sometimes claimed that Austrian economists understand competition better than most economists. This may be a bold claim, since Austrian economists have neither traced the understanding of subjectivity to its very origin (the theory of intentionality), nor have they traced their sympathy for methodological individualism in relation to market processes to its very ground (the theory of (human) action). This paper aims to fill this gap. Moreover, by grounding an Austrian view of competition in analytic action theory, it succeeds in avoiding the serious problems of the dominant equilibrium approach. By explaining competition as rivalry, the paper draws on the philosophy and logic of human action to bring the (economic) agent back into play. In this way, a case is made for an integrated view of Austrian theory as an amalgam of Austrian economics and analytic action theory.
subject: Articles
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creator: Michael Oliva Cordoba
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 107
ending page: 150
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.681

What Rothbard could have done but did not do: The merits of Austrian economics without extreme apriorism
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description: Austrian economics emphasizes a priori components of social scientific theory. Most emphatically, Ludwig Mises and Murray Rothbard champion praxeology, a methodology often criticized as extremely aprioristic. Among the numerous justifications and interpretations of praxeology to be found in the primary and secondary literature, conventionalism avoids the charge of extreme apriorism by construing the fundamental axiom of praxeology as analytic instead of synthetic. This paper (1) explicates the tentative structure of the fundamental axiom, (2) clarifies some aspects of a conventionalist defense of praxeology, and (3) appraises conventionalist praxeology according to Rothbardian criteria. While Rothbard provides an essentialist justification of praxeology and embraces extreme apriorism, a mildly aprioristic conventionalist defense of praxeology fares better on Rothbard’s own criteria and is much more compatible with other contemporary methodological positions and economic theories.
subject: Articles
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creator: Alexander Linsbichler
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 43
ending page: 84
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.678

A praxeology of the value of life. A critique of Rothbard’s argument
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description: The present paper aims to study the issue of the value of life in Murray N. Rothbard’s work, and to examine his argument for the contention that “life should be an objective ultimate value” and that “the preservation and furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom.” Rothbard’s assumptions and presuppositions are investigated and critically assessed. Using conceptual and logical analysis rooted mostly in the praxeological method of economics (as developed by Mises and Rothbard himself) and the theory of value (Scheffler, Raz, Elzenberg), it is demonstrated that Rothbard’s account is fallacious both on its own as well as on broader theoretical grounds. It is argued that what Rothbard could—under his specific assumptions about valuing—correctly claim is only that an actor values life to some extent, rather than that life has an objective ultimate value or preservation and furtherance of one’s life has an axiomatic status. The theoretical argument is supported by empirical illustration from suicide terrorism. The paper submits that Rothbard’s position on the value of life is unsound, and that using his argumentation as it stands cannot succeed.
subject: Articles
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creator: Paweł Nowakowski
rights: Copyright (c) 2024 Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
date: 2024-12-30
publication date: 2024-12-30
starting page: 425
ending page: 456
doi: 10.59203/zfn.76.671